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Title: Innovation and Antibiotic Use within Antibiotic Classes: Market Incentives and Economic Instruments
Authors: Herrmann, Markus
Nkuiya, Bruno
Dussault, Anne-Renée
Keywords: Economics of antibiotic resistance
Antibiotic innovation
Generic industry
Social optimum
Economic instruments
Issue Date: 2013-05
Series/Report no.: Les cahiers du CREATE;2013-3
Abstract: We analyze a monopolist’s incentive to innovate a new antibiotic which is connected to the same pool of antibiotic treatment efficacy as is another drug produced by a generic industry. We outline the differences of antibiotic use under market conditions and in the social optimum. A time and state-dependent tax-subsidy mechanism is proposed to induce the monopolist and generic industry to exploit antibiotic efficacy optimally.
Appears in Collections:Les cahiers du CREATE

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