FrançaisEnglish

Érudit | Dépôt de documents >
CIRANO - Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en analyse des organisations >
Cahiers scientifiques >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

https://depot.erudit.org//id/003974dd

Title: Insensitivity to Prices in a Dictator Game
Authors: Engle-Warnick, Jim
Mishagina, Natalia
Issue Date: 2014-02
Publisher: Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en analyse des organisations (CIRANO)
Series/Report no.: Série scientifique (CIRANO);2014s-19
Scientific series (CIRANO);2014s-19
Abstract: We show that violations of demand theory are more numerous than previously reported in experimental two-player dictator games. We then apply a new procedure consisting of income-compensated price adjustments that makes the choice sets rationalizable. We introduce a weighted price function that shows that violations of revealed preference can be interpreted as the dictator's insensitivity to the price of the dictator's allocation relative to the responder's allocation. Our paper is the first to rationalize violations of demand theory in dictator games by examining the relationship between violations of GARP and prices. We suggest that weighted prices, and not only preferences, may be a component of decision making in dictator games
URI: http://www.cirano.qc.ca/pdf/publication/2014s-19.pdf
https://depot.erudit.org/id/003974dd
ISSN: 1198-8177
Appears in Collections:Cahiers scientifiques

Files in This Item:

2014s-19.pdf (Adobe PDF ; 2.77 MB)

Items in the Repository are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.

 

About Érudit | Subscriptions | RSS | Terms of Use | Contact us |

Consortium Érudit ©  2016