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Title: Learning in a Perfectly Competitive Market
Authors: Mirman, Leonard J.
Salgueiro, Egas M.
Santugini, Marc
Keywords: Asymmetric information
Perfect Competition
Rational Expectations
Issue Date: 2014-09
Series/Report no.: Cahiers du CIRPÉE;14-23
Abstract: We study the informativeness of the price in a perfectly competitive market. A price-taking firm sells a good whose quality is unknown to some buyers. The uninformed buyers use the price to infer information about quality. The shape of the supply curve influences the amount of information contained in the equilibrium price.
Appears in Collections:Cahiers de recherche du CIRPÉE

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