FrançaisEnglish

Érudit | Dépôt de documents >
CREATE - Le Centre de Recherche en économie de l'Environnement, de l'Agroalimentaire, des Transports et de l'Énergie  >
Les cahiers du CREATE >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

https://depot.erudit.org//id/003778dd

Title: Open Access to the Resource of Antibiotic Treatment Efficacy Subject to Bacterial Resistance
Authors: Nkuiya, Bruno
Herrmann, Markus
Keywords: Antibiotic Management
Non-renewable resource
Open access
Social optimum
Public health
Issue Date: 2013-02
Series/Report no.: Les cahiers du CREATE;2013-2
Abstract: In this paper, we are interested in how a pharmaceutical industry manages existing antibiotic drugs in the context of bacterial resistance. We consider a model based on an epidemiological framework where antibiotic recovery rates, and thus intrinsic qualities, may differ. Antibiotic efficacy is modeled as a common pool of a non-renewable resource to which antibiotic producers have open access. The paper derives antibiotic demands within a vertical differentiation model and characterizes the dynamics of infected individuals, antibiotic efficacy and treatment rates under the open-access and the socially optimal allocation. We show that the high-quality antibiotic drug loses its comparative advantage over time under both allocations, such that the low-quality drug should be used longer. This occurs at a later point of time in the social optimum and allows for a better control of infection in the longer run. In contrast with the ambiguous outcome reported in the literature, the socially optimal steady-state level of antibiotic efficacy is lower than that of the open-access allocation. We also extend our analysis to a strategic, duopolistic context.
URI: https://depot.erudit.org/id/003778dd
ISSN: 1927-5544
Appears in Collections:Les cahiers du CREATE

Files in This Item:

CREATE2013-2.pdf, (Adobe PDF ; 836.36 kB)

Items in the Repository are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.

 

About Érudit | Subscriptions | RSS | Terms of Use | Contact us |

Consortium Érudit ©  2016