FrançaisEnglish

Érudit | Dépôt de documents >
CIRPÉE - Centre interuniversitaire sur le risque, les politiques économiques et l'emploi >
Cahiers de recherche du CIRPÉE >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

https://depot.erudit.org/id/003678dd

Title: Peacekeeping: a Strategic Approach
Authors: Blouin, Max
Keywords: Peacekeeping
conflict
responsibility to protect (R2P)
Issue Date: 2012-09
Series/Report no.: Cahiers du CIRPÉE;12-35
Abstract: This paper presents a theoretical model of conflict between two players, with intervention by a peacekeeping force. Peacekeepers are treated as a military contingent, capable of taking sides, acting as a third (independent) side in the war, or remaining inactive, depending on circumstances. This departs from previous models, in which peacekeeping was no more than a parameter affecting players' fighting costs. The main result is an optimal deployment strategy by peacekeepers, detailing the nature and level of intervention required under different circumstances; a strategy which results in the lowest possible level of warfare between the two antagonists. The credible threat of force (rather than mere intervention) is the strategy's key component.
URI: https://depot.erudit.org/id/003678dd
Appears in Collections:Cahiers de recherche du CIRPÉE

Files in This Item:

CIRPEE12-35.pdf, (Adobe PDF ; 253,62 kB)

Items in the Repository are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.

 

About Érudit | Subscriptions | RSS | Terms of Use | Contact us |

Consortium Érudit ©  2014