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Title: Risk Classification and Health Insurance
Authors: Dionne, Georges
Rothschild, Casey G.
Keywords: Adverse selection
Classification risk
Distributional equity
Empirical test of asymmetric information
Ex-ante efficiency
Financial equity
Genetic test
Group equity
Horizontal equity
Insurance rating
Interim efficiency
Moral hazard
Risk characteristic
Risk pooling
Risk classification
Risk separation
Social equity
Issue Date: 2012-08
Series/Report no.: Cahiers du CIRPÉE;12-32
Abstract: Risk classification refers to the use of observable characteristics by insurers to group individuals with similar expected claims, compute the corresponding premiums, and thereby reduce asymmetric information. With perfect risk classification, premiums fully reflect the expected cost associated with each class of risk characteristics and yield efficient outcomes. In the health sector, risk classification is also subject to concerns about social equity and potential discrimination. We present an analytical framework that illustrates the potential trade-off between efficient insurance provision and social equity. We also review empirical studies on risk classification and residual asymmetric information that inform this trade-off.
URI: https://depot.erudit.org/id/003669dd
Appears in Collections:Cahiers de recherche du CIRPÉE

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