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Title: The Welfare Consequences of Monetary Policy and the Role of the Labor Market: a Tax Interpretation
Authors: Ravenna, Federico
Walsh, Carl E.
Keywords: Optimal monetary policy
Search inefficiency
Job vacancies
Unemployment
Issue Date: 2010-09
Series/Report no.: Cahiers du CIRPÉE;10-28
Abstract: We explore the distortions in business cycle models arising from inefficiencies in price setting and in the search process matching firms to unemployed workers, and the implications of these distortions for monetary policy. To this end, we characterize the tax instruments that would implement the first best equilibrium allocations and then examine the trade-offs faced by monetary policy when tax instruments are unavailable. Our findings are that the welfare cost of search inefficiency can be large, but the incentive for policy to deviate from the inefficient flexible-price allocation is in general small. Sizable welfare gains are available if the steady state of the economy is inefficient, and these gains do not depend on the existence of an inefficient dispersion of wages. Finally, the gains from deviating from price stability are larger in economies with more volatile labor flows, as in the U.S.
URI: https://depot.erudit.org/id/003227dd
Appears in Collections:Cahiers de recherche du CIRPÉE

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