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Title: Confirmatory News
Authors: Panova, Elena
Keywords: Competition in the media
quality of news
common priors
reputational cheap-talk
Issue Date: 2009-04
Series/Report no.: Cahiers du CIRPÉE;09-12
Abstract: This paper investigates how competition in the media affects the quality of news. In our model, demand for news depends on the market perception of the media's ability to receive correct information: it is positive if and only if news is potentially useful for the voting decision. When the media receives information which contradics commonly shared priors, it either reports this information or it confirms the priors: "most likely, my information is correct, but my potential buyers may be unable to assess the quality of news and attribute it according to common priors". We ask whether competition may help to elicit information from the media. Our answer is positive when news covers issues on which the priors are sufficiently precise, or the follow-up quality assessment is a likely event. However, when news concerns controversial issues and it is hardly possible to assess its quality, competitive pressures induce confirmatory reporting.
URI: http://132.203.59.36/CIRPEE/cahierscirpee/2009/files/CIRPEE09-12.pdf
https://depot.erudit.org/id/003003dd
Appears in Collections:Cahiers de recherche du CIRPÉE

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CIRPEE09-12.pdf, (Adobe PDF ; 222.33 kB)

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