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Title: Democratic Voting and Social Exclusion
Authors: Dessy, Sylvain
Mbiekop, Flaubert
Keywords: Democratic voting
Social exclusion
Political equilibrium
Issue Date: 2006-05
Series/Report no.: Cahiers du CIRPÉE;06-18
Abstract: This paper explores the political determinants of societies' tolerance for social exclusion on the basis of ethnicity, religion, or race. We develop a political-economic model of social exclusion with three main features. First, each individual living in this society must submit a political proposal regarding the extent to which society must tolerate social exclusion. Second, depending on the realized degree of society's tolerance for social exclusion, each population group comprising the society must decide on how much resources to expend in order to exclude rival groups from, or include its members in, the public allocation of education resources. Third, allocation of resources to participation in the exclusion contest trades off private investment in child's human capital. To the extent that population size is, at least initially, the only source of asymmetry between rival groups, our analysis suggests that the introduction of democratic voting may not be sufficient to save small, but visible, minorities from social exclusion. Only where this asymmetry is moderate, can the introduction of democratic voting suffice to eliminate social exclusion.
URI: http://132.203.59.36/CIRPEE/cahierscirpee/2006/files/CIRPEE06-18.pdf
https://depot.erudit.org/id/001109dd
Appears in Collections:Cahiers de recherche du CIRPÉE

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