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Title: Congruence Among Voters and Contributions to Political Campaigns
Authors: Panova, Elena
Keywords: Campaign contributions
Incumbency advantage
Issue Date: 2007-09
Series/Report no.: Cahiers du CIRPÉE;07-22
Abstract: This paper builds a theory of electoral campaign contributions. Interest groups contribute to political campaigns to signal their private information on the valence of candidates for office. Campaign contributions by an interest group enhance electoral fortunes by a candidate who is valent with this group. The candidate preferred by an interest group whose private information is the most precise receives the highest contributions and wins political office. Campaign contributions are smaller than donor electoral sorting benefits.
Appears in Collections:Cahiers de recherche du CIRPÉE

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