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Title: Relying on the Information of Others: Debt Rescheduling with Multiple Lenders
Authors: Fluet, Claude
Garella, Paolo G.
Keywords: Debt contracts
Asymmetric information
Rescheduling
Bankruptcy
Bayesian games
Issue Date: 2007-06
Series/Report no.: Cahiers du CIRPÉE;07-16
Abstract: Can inertia in terminating unsuccessful loans be due to the multiplicity of lenders in loan arrangements? Can a lender reschedule, betting against his odds? We show that fear of being last in a liquidation run prevents the aggregation of the lenders' information about the value of continuation. Private information in the form of bad but coarse news, that would prompt foreclosure on its own, will instead lead to rescheduling. The gamble is that others lenders may have sharper information. At equilibrium, rescheduling occurs even if all lenders received bad news. This is inefficient (increasing the cost of capital) compared to perfect information sharing. However, from a social point of view, barren information sharing, the equilibrium does not exhibit excessive reliance on the information of others.
URI: http://132.203.59.36/CIRPEE/cahierscirpee/2007/files/CIRPEE07-16.pdf
https://depot.erudit.org/id/001046dd
Appears in Collections:Cahiers de recherche du CIRPÉE

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