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Title: Protection, Lobbying, and Market Structure
Authors: Hillman, Arye
Long, Ngo Van
Soubeyran, Antoine
Issue Date: 2000-04
Publisher: Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en analyse des organisations (CIRANO)
Series/Report no.: Série scientifique (CIRANO);2000s-12
Scientific series (CIRANO);2000s-12
Abstract: On analyse un modèle de lobbying par des entrepreneurs qui allouent leur temps entre les activités de supervision. On donne des réponses aux questions suivantes: (i) quelles sont les allocations de ressources en équilibre? Le lobbying pourrait-il renverser l'ordre de rentabilité parmi les firmes? (iii) y a-t-il une corrélation entre le degré de concentration d'une industrie et la protection qu'elle obtient du gouvernement?

We analyze a model of lobbying by oligopolists who allocate resources between lobbying and internal cost-reducing activities. We ask the following questions: (i) if firms differ with respect to comparative advantage in lobbying, what is the equilibrium allocation of resources between lobbying and cost-reducing activities? (ii) can the possibility of lobbying reverse the profitability ranking among firms? (iii) under what condition is the conventional wisdom (that highly concentrated industries tend to obtain more protection) valid?
URI: http://www.cirano.qc.ca/pdf/publication/2000s-12.pdf
https://depot.erudit.org/id/000314dd
ISSN: 1198-8177
Appears in Collections:Cahiers scientifiques

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