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Title: Strategic Exploitation of a Common Resource under Environmental Risk
Authors: Fesselmeyer, Eric
Santugini, Marc
Keywords: Conservation
Dynamic Games
Environmental Risk
Renewable Resources
Tragedy of the Commons
Issue Date: 2011-10
Series/Report no.: Cahiers du CIRPÉE;11-31
Abstract: We study the effect of environmental risk on the extraction of a common resource. Using a dynamic and non-cooperative game in which an environmental event impacts the renewability and the quality of the resource, we show that the anticipation of such an event has an ambiguous effect on extraction and the tragedy of the commons. A risk of a reduction in the renewability induces the agents to extract less today while a risk of a deterioration in the quality has the opposite effect. Moreover, when environmental risk induces conservation, the tragedy of the commons is worsened.
Appears in Collections:Cahiers de recherche du CIRPÉE

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