FrançaisEnglish

Érudit | Dépôt de documents >
CIRPÉE - Centre interuniversitaire sur le risque, les politiques économiques et l'emploi >
Cahiers de recherche du CIRPÉE >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

https://depot.erudit.org//id/003109dd

Title: Favoritism
Authors: Bramoullé, Yann
Goyal, Sanjeev
Keywords: favoritism
nepotism
reciprocity
repeated games
Issue Date: 2009-10
Series/Report no.: Cahiers du CIRPÉE;09-41
Abstract: Favoritism is the act of offering jobs, contracts and resources to members of one's social group in preference to outsiders. Favoritism is widely practiced and this motivates an exploration of its origins and economic consequences. Our main finding is that individuals have an interest to trade favors over time and that this will come at the expense of others, who are outside their group. We show that favoritism is relatively easier to sustain in smaller groups. Favoritism entails social costs as it usually leads to inefficient allocations. However, favoritism can lead to payoff advantages for larger groups. Productivity enhancing investments are larger in groups which practice favoritism. The availability of investment opportunities can reinforce payoff inequalities across groups.
URI: https://depot.erudit.org/id/003109dd
Appears in Collections:Cahiers de recherche du CIRPÉE

Files in This Item:

CIRPEE09-41.pdf, (Adobe PDF ; 247.12 kB)

Items in the Repository are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.

 

About Érudit | Subscriptions | RSS | Terms of Use | Contact us |

Consortium Érudit ©  2016