Érudit | Dépôt de documents >
CIRPÉE - Centre interuniversitaire sur le risque, les politiques économiques et l'emploi >
Cahiers de recherche du CIRPÉE >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

Title: The Economics of Child Soldiering
Authors: Blouin, Max
Keywords: Child soldiers
civil war
small arms trade
child labor
comparative advantage
Issue Date: 2009-06
Series/Report no.: Cahiers du CIRPÉE;09-20
Abstract: This paper presents a model of conflict which allows belligerents to recruit both adults and children as soldiers. Warlords fight over the country's productive (i.e. non military) output, and are aware of the tradeoff involved in recruitment: anyone who becomes a soldier cannot produce output. In equilibrium, child recruitment is determined by children's productivity relative to adults in both war and civilian production. The model's findings have implications for arms traffic control and bans on child labor.
Appears in Collections:Cahiers de recherche du CIRPÉE

Files in This Item:

CIRPEE09-20.pdf, (Adobe PDF ; 272.1 kB)

Items in the Repository are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.


About Érudit | Subscriptions | RSS | Terms of Use | Contact us |

Consortium Érudit ©  2016