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Title: The Structure of Incentives in a Major Information Systems Outsourcing Contract: The Case of a North American Public Organization
Authors: Aubert, Benoit
Patry, Michel
Rivard, Suzanne
Issue Date: 1995-03
Publisher: Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en analyse des organisations (CIRANO)
Series/Report no.: Série scientifique (CIRANO);95s-14
Scientific series (CIRANO);95s-14
Abstract: Nous utilisons la théorie des mandats pour analyser un important et complexe contrat d'impartition. Ce contrat lie pour plusieurs années une importante entreprise publique et trois impartiteurs de services informatiques. L'étude de l'entente montre que certaines innovations contractuelles permettent de réduire l'opportunisme des fournisseurs.

We use agency theory to shed light on a complex, multi-year outsourcing contract between an important public organization and three major information services outsourcers. The contractual arrangement shows that innovative contracts can be drawn that reduce the scope of supplier opportunism.
ISSN: 1198-8177
Appears in Collections:Cahiers scientifiques

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