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Title: The Effects of the Length of the Period of Commitment on the Size of State International Environmental Agreements
Authors: Nkuiya, Bruno
Keywords: International environmental agreements
Global pollution
Stock pollution
Dynamic games
Issue Date: 2012-08
Series/Report no.: Les cahiers du CREATE;2012-7
Abstract: This paper extends the standard model of self-enforcing dynamic international environmental agreements by allowing the length of the period of commitment of such agreements to vary as a parameter. It analyzes the pattern of behavior of the size of stable coalitions, the stock of pollution, and the emission rae as a function of the length of the period of commitment. It is shown that the length of the period of commitment can have very significant effects on the equilibrium. We show numerically that at the initial date, as the length of commitment is increased, the potential gain from cooperation tends to diminish, increasing the disincentive to ratify the agreements. This suggests that considerable attention should be given to the determination of the length of such international agreements.
URI: https://depot.erudit.org/id/003670dd
Appears in Collections:Les cahiers du CREATE

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