

Economic Indicators and Marriage: Exploring Their Relationships Using the Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics

> Zenaida R. Ravanera and Fernando Rajulton Population Studies Centre University of Western Ontario

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Topics

Some theories and a framework for analysis

- Brief discussion of results using GSS2001
- Data and Methods
 - Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics
 - Limitations and analytic strategy
- Results of Analysis
- Conclusion: research plans and implications of findings

Some economic-related theories on timing of marriage

- Economic independence hypothesis –'the gain from marriage is reduced by a rise in the earnings and labour force participation of women and by a fall in fertility because a sexual division of labour becomes less advantageous' (Becker 1981: 248)
- Career entry hypothesis "the increasingly achieved nature of women's socio-economic characteristics introduces some of the same delaying factors into marriage formation that has traditionally existed for men" (Oppenheimer and Lew 1995: 116)
 - Education -- duration spent in education delays entry into marriage for both men and women
 - Labour force participation "provides greater access to more attractive marriage markets, increase a young woman's desirability as a potential mate, or facilitate an earlier marriage than would be possible if it were based on the young man's earning alone (p. 118)
 - Earnings -- "women in better-earnings position occupy a more attractive marriage-market position" and a woman's "higher earnings make it possible to marry while a young man's earnings positions is still somewhat shaky" (p.120).



1st Demographic Trans. 2nd Demographic Trans.

	Complementary	Shared
Economic Independence	Earnings and LFP Men – positive Women – negative	
Economic Inter- dependence		Earnings and LFP Men – positive Women – positive
Career entry	Education (duration) Men – negative Women negative	Education (duration) Men – negative Women negative

Results from 2001 General Social Survey

Hazards Coefficients of Entry into Parenthood

Missing

Men, 1961-80 Birth Cohort

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Respondent's Education			
Some High School ®			
High School Graduate	-0.244 ***	-0.228 ***	-0.206 ***
Some College	-0.446 ***	-0.388 ***	-0.204 **
College/University Grad	-0.593 ***	-0.582 ***	-0.389 ***
Personal Income			
Less than \$20,000 ®			
\$20,000 - \$49,999	0.428 ***	0.413 ***	-0.009
\$50,000 or higher	0.637 ***	0.547 ***	-0.011
Missing	0.488 ***	0.503 ***	-0.001

Women, 1961-80 Birth Cohort

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Respondent's Education			
Some High School ®			
High School Graduate	-0.546 ***	-0.651 ***	-0.755 ***
Some College	-0.852 ***	-0.942 ***	-0.962 ***
College/University Grad	-0.944 ***	-1.088 ***	-1.129 ***
Personal Income			
Less than \$20,000 ®			
\$20,000 - \$49,999	-0.507 ***	-0.366 ***	-0.347 ***
\$50,000 or higher	-0.978 ***	-0.763 ***	-0.740 ***

-0.307 ***

-0.244 ***

-0.270 ***

Limitation: Cross-sectional data, 20-year birth cohort



Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics

□ Longitudinal

- □ Panel 1 1993, 1994, ... 1998
- □ Limitations:
 - Attrition high for young, never married men and women
 - Right-censoring use of survival analysis
 - Left-censoring use of an analytical strategy

Use of 3-year Age Groups, and Additional hypothesis

Table 1: Percentage Never Married in 1992by Sex and Age-Group

Table 2: Percentage Married by 1998
Among the Never Married in 1992
By Sex and Age Group

Men	17-19	20-22	23-25	Total
Total N	829	753	802	2384
%	98.7	89.2	64.5	84.2
Single	818	672	517	2007
Women	15-17	18-20	21-23	Total
Ν	834	745	804	2383
N %	834 99.2	745 89.1	804 61.9	2383 83.5

	Age (Group in 19	992	
Men	17-19	20-22	23-25	Total
Weighted N	527	411	324	1262
%	10.6	26.0	39.2	23.0
Women	15-17	18-20	21-23	Total
Weighted N	469	462	404	1335
%	8.1	26.2	36.4	22.9

Additional	Hypothesis:
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Early Age	"Right Age"	Late Age
Career-entry	Economic Interdependence (strong)	Economic Interdependence (weak)
Education	IncomeLabour Force Part.	□ Income □ Labour Force Part

Methods and Variables

- Proportional Hazards Model (using STATA)
 Dependent variable Age at marriage
 Independent variables:
 - Career-entry
 - Father's education (time invariant)
 - Respondent's education (time-varying)
 - Economic Inter-dependence
 - Wages and Salaries (time-varying)
 - Labour Force Status (time-varying)
 - Others
 - Region (time-varying)



Relative Risks of Marriage (Hazard ratios and p values) Father's and Respondent's Education

Non-University Post Sec.

University Degree

	47.4		00.0	10	00.0	<i>۲</i>					
	17-1 Hazard Ratio	p>IzI	20-2 Hazard Ratio	p>IzI	23-2 Hazard Ratio		Izl				
Father's Education (ti) Elementary ®											
Some HS & HS Graduate	0.58	0.27	1.09	0.85	1.03	0.93					
Post-Secondary	0.33	0.05	1.35	0.47	0.96	0.93		Men			
Respondent's Education (tvc) Less than High School Grad ®											
Graduated High School	0.97	0.18	1.01	0.66	1.03	0.14					
Non-University Post Sec.	0.98	0.35	1.01	0.53	1.02	0.23					
University Degree	1.00	0.97	1.01	0.54	1.02	0.29					
					1	5-17		18-20)	21-23	
					Hazar	ď	p>lzl	Hazard	p>IzI	Hazard	p>IzI
					Rati	0		Ratio		Ratio	
	F		ucation (ti)								
		Elementa	•								
Women			& HS Gra	duate	0.4		0.07	1.49	0.25	1.13	0.74
women		Post-Sec	ondary		0.4	.3	0.13	0.99	0.98	1.81	0.13
	R	Responden	t's Educati	on (tvc)							
		Less than	n High Sch	ool Grad ®)						
		Graduate	d High Sch	nool	0.9	6	0.08	0.98	0.28	1.03	0.35

0.95

0.93

0.06

0.15

0.98

1.00

0.28

0.98

0.23

0.62

1.03

1.01

Relative Risks of Marriage (Hazard ratios and p values) Father's Education and Wages and Salaries

	17-1	9	20-2	22	23-2	25	
	Hazard Ratio	p>IzI	Hazard Ratio	p>IzI	Hazard Ratio	p>IzI	
Father's Education (ti)							
Elementary ®							Men
Some HS & HS Graduate	0.53	0.23	0.99	0.98	1.07	0.85	
Post-Secondary	0.32	0.03	1.22	0.63	0.84	0.69	
Wages and Salaries (\$1000) (tvc)	1.0010	0.06	1.0014	0.00	1.0005	0.04	

		15-1	7	18-20		21-2	23	
		Hazard Ratio	p>IzI	Hazard Ratio	p>IzI	Hazard Ratio	p>lzl	
	Father's Education (ti) Elementary ®							
	Some HS & HS Graduate	0.33	0.02	1.67	0.19	1.02	0.96	
Women	Post-Secondary	0.29	0.03	1.15	0.73	1.58	0.22	
	Wages and Salaries (\$1000) (tvc)	1.0002	0.86	1.0011	0.03	1.0002	0.62	

Relative Risks of Marriage (Hazard ratios and p values) Father's Education and Labour Force Status

-	17-1	9	20-2	22	23-2		
	Hazard	p>IzI	Hazard	p>lzl	Hazard	p>IzI	
	Ratio		Ratio		Ratio		
Father's Education (ti)							
Elementary ®							
Some HS & HS Graduate	0.50	0.21	0.98	0.96	1.06	0.85	
Post-Secondary	0.29	0.02	1.28	0.57	0.76	0.51	Men
Labour Force Status (tvc)							
Employed All Year ®							
Employed Part-Year	1.00	0.86	0.98	0.21	1.00	0.82	
Not Employed	0.93	0.05	0.94	0.03	0.94	0.01	

		15-17		18-20		21-23	,
		Hazard Ratio	p>IzI	Hazard Ratio	p>IzI	Hazard Ratio	p>lzl
	Father's Education (ti) Elementary ®						
Women	Some HS & HS Graduate	0.30	0.01	1.43	0.33	0.90	0.78
	Post-Secondary	0.27	0.02	1.00	0.99	1.41	0.36
	Labour Force Status (tvc) Employed All Year ®						
	Employed Part-Year	1.02	0.29	0.99	0.17	1.00	0.80
	Not Employed	0.96	0.15	0.96	0.05	0.96	0.05



Relative Risks of Marriage (Hazard ratios and p values) Full Model -- Men

	17-19		20-22		23-25	
	Hazard Ratio	p>IzI	Hazard Ratio	p>IzI	Hazard Ratio	p>lzl
Father's Education (ti)	Ratio		Ratio		Ratio	
Elementary ®						
Some HS & HS Graduate	0.57	0.25	0.88	0.77	1.09	0.80
Post-Secondary	0.36	0.04	1.08	0.86	0.68	0.39
Respondent's Education (tvc)						
Less than High School Grad ${ m I\!R}$						
Graduated High School	0.96	0.03	1.00	1.00	1.02	0.31
Non-University Post Sec.	0.98	0.30	1.01	0.82	1.01	0.68
University Degree	0.98	0.70	1.00	0.97	1.00	0.83
Wages and Salaries (\$1000) (tvc)	1.0009	0.10	1.0013	0.00	1.0007	0.04
Labour Force Status (tvc)						
Employed All Year ®						
Employed Part-Year	1.02	0.37	1.00	0.96	1.02	0.17
Not Employed	0.95	0.19	0.98	0.52	0.97	0.24
Region (tvc)						
Atlantic ®						
Quebec	0.96	0.15	0.95	0.03	0.95	0.01
Ontario	1.05	0.03	0.98	0.25	1.00	0.81
Prairie	1.02	0.28	0.98	0.19	0.99	0.55
British Columbia	1.03	0.40	1.00	0.96	0.94	0.02

Relative Risks of Marriage (Hazard ratios and p values) Full Model -- Women

	15-17		18-20		21-23	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
	Hazard Ratio	p>IzI	Hazard Ratio	p>IzI	Hazard Ratio	p>lzl
Father's Education (ti)						
Elementary ®						
Some HS & HS Graduate	0.36	0.03	1.23	0.56	0.86	0.66
Post-Secondary	0.35	0.06	0.88	0.76	1.25	0.56
Respondent's Education (tvc)						
Less than High School Grad ${ m I\!R}$						
Graduated High School	0.95	0.04	0.97	0.06	1.01	0.62
Non-University Post Sec.	0.95	0.09	0.97	0.08	1.02	0.38
University Degree	0.91	0.09	0.99	0.46	1.01	0.78
Wages and Salaries (\$1000) (tvc)	0.9998	0.91	1.0012	0.01	0.9998	0.67
Labour Force Status (tvc)						
Employed All Year ®						
Employed Part-Year	1.01	0.54	1.00	0.70	1.00	0.86
Not Employed	0.95	0.11	0.97	0.14	0.97	0.13
Region (tvc)						
Atlantic ®						
Quebec	0.96	0.15	0.95	0.00	0.96	0.08
Ontario	1.03	0.16	0.99	0.61	1.00	0.95
Prairie	1.03	0.17	0.99	0.33	1.01	0.41
British Columbia	1.02	0.49	0.97	0.11	1.02	0.25

Conclusion 1: Research Plans

Panel 2 of SLID

Cohabitation

- A theoretical framework different from marriage
- Dates of cohabitation not asked but, marital status at each year is available
- Use logistic regression or similar procedure
- Relation between cohabitation and marriage
- Advantage of GSS over SLID availability of information about culture and values, and more information about parents

Conclusion 2: Some thoughts on implications of findings

Two forces behind polarization

- Career-entry hypothesis -- differences in human, social, and financial investment on children
- Economic inter-dependence hypothesis assortative mating process pairs men and women with potentials for high earnings

□ Interventions that would help ...

- reduce the effect of disparities in parental resources
- increase opportunities for employment of both young men and women
- change perception that family and work are incompatible
 - interventions that facilitate the balancing of family and work life such as those related to family benefits and the provision of child-care services